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APPEXDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: hote that each value of z can be víewed as a distinct
contract in the Riley 119791 franewurk. Given this, our definition of a DS1~C
policy corresponds precisely with the definition of strongly infor~ationally
consistent ISI`C) polícies in the (static) framework of Hiley. `ow. the only
essential difference between the DRE and Riley's reactive equilibrium is the
additional subKamr perfection requirement in the DkE. However. this
requirement appears both in the definition of ihe DRE and the definition of
DS.XC policies. Thus. applyinC kiley's logic, it must be true that the Pareto
dominant DSI~C policy is the DRE. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: The proof invulves a comparison of the collateral
a]]ucetions ÍCÍ - CH: CHII - W) and {CH - CÍ -~: CH1I - h-~?
v~ E!0. CÍIlloptl - N], where CHIlloptl is the loptimall leve] of collatera]
needed to avoid rationing and ~ is a real valued (scalarl perturbation. Kote
that
CIIIIopt) - drjmóH]-1
We will prove the lemma for the more restrictive case in which borrowers
ratíoned at t-0 get the same second period contracts as the (lucky) good
borrowers that obtained credit at t-0. As we know. such an assumption improves
the attractiveness of rationing at t-0. Thus. íf the lemma holds for this
lover]y) restríctive case, it must ho]d in general. Let single hats on
variables denote the original solution with no rationing at t-0 and let double
hats on variables denote the alternative solution with rationing at t-0. ~utc
that the contracts for the borrowers which are bad at t-0 are the same in both
alternatives. This meansAPP-2
[:I16L~óLl - [:I(dLldLl.
Further. in equilibríue ( see 113))
L'IIdL(dLl - UI(dH(6L1.
Co~bining (A-1) nnd ( A-21 yields
L'IIdH(dL) ~ l:I(óH(dL).
Froe the definitions under ( 21' and the condition ( 41' we got






t;IldR~óL) - nÍ[óLR; -~{C~-~}) - dL[{1-fc}ëH r KóL)R` - óLóLR;. IA-51
Substituting IA-41 and ( A-5) in (A-11 gives
tr~ - (dyR` - mCH){óLR; - ~ICI - ~]}-1.
From ( 11). (121. ( 4)' and the definition under (31'. we have
LIIdHIdR) - r.~fóHR; - [l-~]ëH(CH-41} - [dH)2R~
(A-61
~ óHvól'R; - dR(1-v]trHII{dyR; -(7-sJdH(W-~]} IA 71
where n1]] - {óLR;)(dLR` - m(W-~]) 1.
From (A-71. it follows that
èl:Ildy(dRl~a4'
- -{~(dLRH - tPCH]}{dLRH - m(CR - ~J}-2(óHRH - [1-S)dH[CH - ~)) ~ 7 1 I ~ I
t {dLRn - sDCi } { [ 1-(3]dH) (dLRn - ~(CÍ - d'] }-1
- dH[]-v)dLR~(1-s]ëH(óLRH - ~IW ' ~)}-1
ï dH(]-v]Q6LR;fdHRn - []-~JóH[W - 4]}{dLRn - ~[W - ~]}-1 IA-81
and è2[;IIdR~dH)~~2
.
- 2~G1{dRH - dLdH[1-g][1-~dH(dR}-1J[CH - ~J}{G1 ~ ~)-3
- 2~óLdR;R;éR(7 vJióLR; - ~(M' - 41])-3.
where G1 s 6LR; - mC~
IA-41APP-3
(vote that both terss in (A-91 are strictly positive. Thus. íf it is optinal to
accept some rationing at t-0 li.e., the transfer of a s~all level. ~. of
collateral ís positive). then it is always optieal to ~axiraíze 0(l.e..
eaximize rationing at t-o) such that rationing of good borrowers in the
contracts node III ís coepletely eliminated. This tells us that rationing will
be restricted to one of the contracts -- either contract I or contract III --
and will not occur in both. Thus. it is left to co~pare the allocation
{CH - CH:
CHII - W} with the allucation {CÍ
- CH -~max' CHII - W ~maa}
where
~max -
CIIllopt) - K. The oriKinal allocation implies
ni - 1. nHII - óCk;;dLR~ mN) I. (This follows fron ( A-fi) and ( A-7) for ~- 0.)
Xute that ttHII eyuals one for an optimal]y collaterized contract. Thus. we
have
- d`R~{dLR~ - mCHlllopt)}-1 -1. H
r1II
I CHII - CIIlloptl
which imp'ies
óLR` - ó~R~ ~CIII(optl
This allows us to rewrite the uriginal solution as
nÍ - 1.
nIII - {óCR; - ~CIIIIopt)}(óLR~ - mN}-I.
The alternative solution follows directly from (A-6) and (A-71 for
~-~max - CHII(opt) - W. It follows that
ni ~ {dLR; - mCI)4óLR; - ~CI ~ ~~CII11opt) - W]} I.
"H
~III - 1'
`ow, we want to show that
L'IIdH~dHl - l;I(dH~6Hll ? 0.




[:sing (A-8) eives us
I;IIóH~dHl - L'I(óR~dRl
- I~ - CIII(opt) - W
-[nl - rrH][óHR` - dH{1-6)CÍj - n~6 [1-B][CI]](optl - W]
- óH[1-vj[nHI] - nHI1J(óRR~ - ll-B}dyW)
f èH[1-v1nIII[1-S]óH[CIII{opt) - W).
yaking the appropriate substitutions for a]] of the credït grantinK
probabilities ~.ields
liI(óH~6H1 - L"IIdHIóR)~
I~ - CIII(opt) - W
- [CIII - N]R`(~dH - éHS]-(3)dLJ[C2-] - G3]
where G2 a dI~R; -~CJ - m[CHIllopt) - WJ
G3 - óN[7-v](óI.R; ~NJ-1
The expression in IA-101 is positive if
GZ-] ~ G3.
which ~eans we need
óLRn - ~W ~ 6H[]-vJ(dLRr - ~CI - ~{CIII(opt) - W}J,
or equivalently
[1-dH(1-v}JdLR~ ~ ~(1-óHSl-v}]W - dH[1-v]mCIII{opt) - dH[1-v]eD.
The above inequality can be ~ade ~ore restrictive by substituting




R? r[áL]-1 w c CII1(oPtl and CÍ ~ ór[~óH]-1[1~dL{1-9Yd~ ll.
where the last inequality follows fro~ (151. Note that íf (A-111 holds with
the above inequalities substituted in. then it ~ust ho]d in general Iwhen the
above inequalities do not hold). This Is because the above inequalitles sake
it aore difficult to satisfy (A-111. Also substltuting CÍIlloptl - 6r[~éH]-1
gives us the followíng version of (A-111
[1-dH11-v)]óL[r{dL)-1
r(dH)-]] ~ G~ - G~.
where G~ e [1-óHtl-v)]ór[dH]-1
G~ s 6H[1-vj~ór(QóH]-1 - dH[]-v]~dr[]-óL(1-~)óH~-lj[~dH]-I
Thus. we need
G; ~ G~ - dH(1-vJáL[i-6j6H.
ur
-[áH?Z[I-vjdL[1-~, ~ 0.
which is certainly true. Thus. we have shown that
L'1fóH~dH1 - L'IIóH~dHl ~ 0.
I~ - CHIlloptl - W
implying ihat rationing at t-0 is not optimal. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: Obvious, since the theoree is only a collectiun of results
established in the proof of LewAa 1 and elsewhere. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEhLMA 2: It is sufficient to show that 116) holds for
CHII - 0 and
CHI1 - CNIllopt). For CIII - 0. I]6) becomes
óH[óL]-] ~ dH[óL]-1
and for
CÍII - ór[~óH]-1. ( 16) becoaesAPP-6
{êHR - r - [1-g]dHÓr[odH]-1}{dLR - óLr[óH] 1 - dr[dH]-1~-] ~ óH[óL]-1
which óolds IFF
{It[1-91óH6[OdHj-])r(dH[dI.]-1}-1 ~ 1.
The above inequality can be written as
dLdH~ ~ Ii-g]óHddL 5 [ëH]2m.
or equivalently
óLdHdL - g[óL)2dH - 6óLó - gëHéLd ~[dH]2óL - gdLÓHdH.
which holds if
gdLÓHd - gdHóLd ~ óHÓLó - óL3Hè.
or
0 ~ d2,
which is certainly true. 7his establishes l16). Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3: Kote that rationing only occurs ín the Contracts ?1-
nodes. Nr know from our previous analysis that in those nodes the fo]loMin~
equality holds
LII1(dH~óL~ - LIII(dLldl.~
In general this implies.
~HII{dL[R~III]
-
dLCIII) L nlIl{dLR; - dL[1-g]C]II}' (A-12)
Our equilibrium concept (~ore apecifically, the sub-game perfection
require~ent) implies that only one of the contracts III ~ay involve collatera]
and rationing. This is because rationing and collateral involve deadweig}it
costs, and it is only in the interest of bank and Dorrower to Dear those costs
if they are necessary for separation. For example. if both contracts in~~ol~~e
rationing, the bank and the borrower can increase their payoffs by removing
rationing in one of these contracts and reducing it in the other contract.APF'-7
without losing separation. Note also it is the contract for good borrowers
that involves collateral and, if necessary, rationing. Therefore. we ~ay
rewrite (A-12) as,
nIIISóL~R~H11~
- óLCHII} ` óLIR-a1I1~ (A-13!
Now, we establish that the contract {aHII. CHII. nHII} should always De a zero-
profit contract for the bank. That is. óHalII - óH~CIII ` r. ~ote that if the
contract were profitable. an entering (second periodl spot ~arket bank would be
able to break the "profitable" origina] contract. Likewise. a nore complicated
argument asserts that the contract can not impose losses on the bank. We shall
present t}~is argunent verba]]y. Froa Figure 1 we see that the firsi period
contracts are also separating. Kotice that ihese contracts take into account
the entire two period time horizon. and the second period contracts have an
impact on the incentive compatibilit~ of these first period contracts.
Incenti~~e compatibility of the first period contract for good borrowers is
easier to establish if the contracts IlI are as unattractive as possible. The
reason is that minicking bad borrowers at t-0 are nore likr.ly than the good
borrowers at t-0 to end up in the contracts III nodes. Hence. making the
contracts III as unattractive as possíb]'e "costlessly" resolves part of the
incentive conpatíbility problem at t-0. Thus. we have
aIII 2 r~óHj-1 - óH9CIII~óH~ I'
IA-141
The intertenporal contract solution to be presented later will indicate that
good borrowers in the contracts node lIl will always use all the collateral
they have available. (Note. it ís assumed that Wp - CÍ ~ CÍII(optl). That is.
H H IA-Ig)
CIII - W~ - CI
The arguments used above to deternine áHII
in principle also hold for the
determination of aÍII




to be as high as possible while entering spot market banks at t-]
force an upper bound on this interest factor of r~óL. But look at (A-131. If
the equality in (A-13) currently holds for so~e nII1 ~~(that is, rationing





and~or increese CÍII. ~ote that an
increase in CÍII is ruled out by ( A-15) and an increase !n aIII invites
co~petition from entering spot ~arket banks. Hence, its value is fixed by
(A-141. Reducing a~II is a possibility but it will make the incentive
compatibilíty of the contracts at t-0 eore difficult. In other words. once we
reduce aIII. we have to adjust aH and CÍ in order to presf~rve lncentive
compatibility of the first period contracts. By (A-151 this will also affect
CÍII
Thus. we see that the following variables ~ust be adjusted in order tc~
remove rationing from contracts node III
{aH. CÍ. nHII' CHI1' aIII}'
IA-]61
Ttie variables related to the borrower's contract in node I do not entei~ this
set because the intertempora] contract solution will indicate that these are
alwavs first best. The contracts node II variables do not enter ihe set
either. because in the intertempora] contract solution a bindine constraint
will be in effect on those variables.
As argued earlier, rationing might disappear from the iode] by reducing
aIII
in (A-131. This ~akes the contracts node III oore attractive, which
causes incentive compatibility problees because ~i~icking bad borrowers at t-0
are ~ore likely to end up i n these contracts. These incentíve coepatibility
problems require an adjusteent !n (aH, CÍ), whích ín Stself affects the
contract for good borrowers in node III since CHII depends on CH through
(A-]51. Furthermore. a reduction in a~II has also a primary effect in thatAPP-9
it causes losses to the bank which eust be recouped through an offsetting
adjustaent in (aÍ. Cil. we can suwaarize this sche~atica]ly as follows
L (A) by ( A-13) R
aIII 1 nIII t
áH t
IB) CÍ t Dy IA-15) - CIIIT
by (A-13) ~ nHII l
where "-" distinguishes the effects IAI and IB1:
IA) direct effect: nÍII increases by (A-]31 and áH increases by the
intertemporal zero expected profit condition for the bank:
l81 indirect effect: CÍ increases and aH decreases. with both
adjustments chosen such that it has no effect on the expected profit
of the bank. and it makes first period contracts more incentive




Xow. we will derive the sufficiency cnndition for no rationing in contracts
node III. It will turn out that this is identical to deríving a condition sucti
that the (positivel direct effect IA) on
nÍII
exceeds thr Inegative) indirect
effect IB) on nIII.
I1) The Direct Effect (A): Substitute (A-]4) in (A-13) and rewrite to get,
nIII ` {6LIR-aII1~}{6LRn - mCIIII-1 lA-]71
Differentiating (A-171 w.r.t.
aill
gives the direct effect IA) on nIII'
- ~III~~III -
óL{6LR` -
mCIII)-] ~ 0. (A-181
The derivative i n (A-18) i~plíes that decreasing the interest for bad borrowers
in the contracts III node increases the credit granting probability for good
borrowers in that node. The dlrect effect on áH is to compensate the bank forAPP 30
the losses it sustains in reducing a~II. The zero expected profit condition
i~plies
a(bank profitl~~I11 ~{~l~~lll{' a( bank profit)~àxÍ : 0.
Define profit as expected profit per good borrower at t-0. Then
a(bank profitl~BaÍII ~ dvdL and àlbank profit)IàxÍ z dH. Thus. we get
~I~~III ` - d
vóL[dH[-]
IA-]91
(2) The Indirect Effect ( B): We now examine the first period incentive
compatibility effects of the reduction in aÍII We know from 113) that
t'I(dL~dLl - l;I(dH~dLl. ~ote that the variables in IA-]61 have no impact on




L~IIèH~dLl - dL[R-o:Í] - óLCi
- 6óL(R-aIII{
- dli[1-ft]dH - FtéL}{R-ctÍl}
Differentiating w.r.t. o:ÍII gives (constraint on aHI is bindíng in the
interte~npora] solutionl
- èl:I(dH~dLl~aallI
where ~tI ~~I I I
is given in
- óL((BáÍ~aaII1[ - [~1~~]I1~}
- ó (aCHidczIII~ - ódL.
IA-]91 and. aaI~~III and èCÍIóaÍII are
IA-201
such that
incentive coapatibility is guaranteed and the bank's expected profít
zero. The latter requiresent implies that
dH(~H~~IIII ~ 66[aCÍiaaIII~ - 0.
Substituting (A-19) and (A-21) ín (A-20) and rearranging produces
- aCy~aal]I ` {dL[dáL - vd61)[dH]-1){[d6L - ~6Ié ](dH~-1)-]
- 6L4~-1.




Substitute ( A-221 ín ( A-21) to get
- aaÍidctlII - - Ió66E1{OëH)-] IA-23)
From (A-22) and ( A-231 we see that the íncen[ive compatibility problems which
arise from the reduction Sn
aÍII
are resolved by increasing the first period
collateral requirement. The reduction in aH is to preserve zero expected
profít for the bank. From ( A-15) we see that
- aCHl I i~I I1 ~-[-aCÍ Idcx1I I J.
IA-291
Combine (A-241 and (A-221 to obtain
H L L -1
- dCI]I ~III ' - è r;m .
The change in CIII has an effect on nIII' f~rom IA-17) wP get
~HII~BCIII - ~HIIm1éLRn - ~CII11-1
IA-251
Combining this wiih IA-251 we get




From IA-261 we see that the indírect effect of the reduction in aÍll is to
reduce the credit granting probability. The sufficiency condítion we will
derive guarantees that the indirect effect in IA-261 never offsets the
Ipositive) direct effect in IA-181.
With (A-l9), (A-231. (A-22), (A-18). (A-26) and (A-241, the relations
between the adjustments in (A-16) are determined. We will now derive a
sufficiency condition for the adjustsents to have a positive impact on the good
borrower's utility. This condition ís identical to the sufficiency condition
for the suboptimality of rationing. Recal] that
l:1(áHlóHl - óH(R-aH] - éCÍ -(éHJ2[R - aHI]
- [1-v]nIII{óHRH - [1-BJóCIII}
- óvóL[R - aIIIJ'
IA-271aPP-12
The reduction in aJll has direct and indirect effects on L'HIdH~óHl. From
(A-27) we get
- dl:I(dH~dHl~da71I
- - dH{I-~H~aotL ) t I-aaH~óaL )} - 6 [-èCHióaL )
I III I III I III
- d [I-vj[{-ónIII~~II1} ~ 1-~rrHII~~III}){dHRH - [I-S]ó CIII}
- ~[1-v)trH [7-~16 [-8CH ~BctL ) - dvdL[-aacL IàxL )
III III 7II III III
Upon substituting (A-18), (A-]91. (A-22). (A-231, (A-241 nnd (A-261 in the




- d-d ~E[mdH)-1} - ~dLE~-1
- 6 []-v){dLG6-I -
~yIIdLEC6-]}{dHR; - [1-~)ótIII}
- d []-v)nHII[]-S)6 dLE4' I- 6vdL. IA 281
where G6 - dLRy - ~CHII
L'nfortunate]y, it is not possib]e to evaluate 1A-281. Also. the second
derivative of L'I(dH~dH) w.r.t. aÍII
is ambiguous. Hence. we have to ]ook for
a sufficienc~~ condition. Ne want to show that (A-281 is positíve. First. we
note that óL - ttÍIIdI'Q ~ 0. Thus. substituting the finding of Lemma 2 in
IA-281 will reduce IA-281. That is.
- dCllóH~óH)idallI
? ddBE~ I- dóEm I~ ó[1-v]dL[I-TrHIIE)dH[dL)-1
- [d )2[1-v)[I-~)TrHIIóLE~-1~ IA-291
[vote that the right hand side (RHS) of (A-29) is oinioized for nÍll - 1. To
see this, observe that
8[dLI(óH~dHl~dalllJ~~HII
-- ó[1-v]dHE - Íó )2[I-v)[]-(3)dLE~ I ~ 0
sincc - dH - 6[I BIdL~-I ~ 0.APP ]3
H
Substituting
ttIII - 1 we get
- dl:I(óH[áH1~daIII
? -[1-)3]d~EO-1 ~ 6 []-v)dE[1-E)dH[dL)-1
- [d]2[]-v][]-~)dbE~-1. (A-30)
The RHS of (A-30) is non-negative if
-[1-9)EO 1~[1-v)[1-E)6H[6L] 1 t ó[1-v)[1-6]E~-1 ? 0.
This í~plíes that we need
~(1-v][1-E)dH[dL] 1 ? (I-9)E[]-{1-v)ó ].
Substitute the expressions for E and m in the inequality above and note that
1-[1-v)6 - dH - vó . to obtain
{óó' - 6óLé }{dH)-]{I-v16H{6L}-]{óL(óH - v~][dH] ]}
? [7-g]td 6 - vdLÓ )1dH)-1{dH - vó ).
which implies




PROOF OF THEOREM 4: Apply the Simplex algorithm. Take into account only the
constraints ( 19), (21), ( 24) and ( 25). First, re add alack variables to these
constraints. Substituting ( 26). we obtain
- 6HaH - dgCÍ -[dH]2aII - 6(1-v)dHaIII - óvdLaIII
t S1 L-2r t[6 ]2[1-v]9për[mdH)-1 1191'
dHaIII - S2 - r-d9~rd[mdH]-1 l21)'
-èLaIII ' dLaIII ' S3 - 66r6[Q,óH]-1. 124)'
-dLaH - dCÍ - 6E(èH - d}~]aHi - ~d~a1II - S4 - -2r
In the tableaus I through V. we apply the Simplex algorithm. Tableau V is theTABLEAU I:
aH cH
I I












aIII aIII S1 S2 S3 S4
















c~-Z~ - dH -(1-óH)
0 0 0 1 -2r
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
-dHdH -(1-dH)(1-v)QH -(1-dH)vdL 0 0 0 0
(1) Sow 1 ~ Add -QHIdL (How 4)
(2) Sow ~-~ Multiply by -lldL -i aÍ in BasisT~BLLAU ll:
H H
ol Cl















cl) aw~ ~ i ~ea - e l-b (ao.~ l)
bH~ . bL
(2) Bar 1 ~ N~ltlplil Ef bL~bw
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N" Nx Ni -. -APP-]4
end-tableau.
(I~SERT TABLEAliS ABOI;T HERE]
Recalling that E was defíned i~~edlately preceding Le~~a 1 and tn the proof of
Theores 3. the solution indicates
~i ~ ór[~óH]-1{2
- d9Em-1 r[ó ]2[1-vIóL96[~dH]-1 - G7 t G8)
where GT s: óL[dH ~ vó
][óH]-1
G8 e óL[dH - vd ]ódA~[m{óH)2]-1
After considerable algebra. the above expression simplifies to
c`~ - dr[] - I1-e)E]fmdR]-]
The solution also indicates that
áÍ - 2i[óL]-1
- 26 [óL]-lóÍmóH]-1 G9 - G10 - G11
where G9 - (ó ]2(1-v]óE~ór[m2{óH}2]-1
G]0 a 6 [d ]2[v-~]Aár[{dH)2~2]-1
G]] - 66[midH)2] 1[óR - dL~ - dv][r - dAgó{~óH) ]]





Substituting the solution for CÍ in the'above expression. we get
a~Í - []-óH]r[dH] ] - 6[óHl ](~CÍ - dór[1-A]vm{[óHJ2~} ].
The solution also indicates that
aIII - r[óH] 1 - 66óró
[~ióH)2]-1
[:sing 126) gives us
aIII - r[óH] ] - ó 9CIII[óH]
]'
Furthermore.
aIII - r[óH]-1 ~ [6 {óL)-1 - dg(óR? ]]Adr[~dH]-1
- r[óN]-l T ~ór[~óHóL]-]APP-IS
which can be written as
aIII - r[óL]-I - m[]-6]ór(~óLdH]-I
~ote also that
aÍII
is not a basis variable. Thus. the Simplex algorithm
i~plies that
aÍI - 0.
Finally. by (26) and our collatera] assusption, we obtain
OHII - Aêr[~àH]-7
So. we have determined the intertempora] cuntract thet a good borrower Qets at
t-0. As argued earlier. bad borrowers obtain a contract that yields an average
expected utility per period equal to the first best for them. Thus. ihc-ir
total expected interest cost is 2r. Generally. there is no unique solution
However. it is easy to see that the solution {aj. aÍ~. aÍ~. aV) as stated in
the theorem implies an expected interest cost of 2r. and cannot be broken b}-
spot market competitors at t-1. Q.E.D.
H H 1
PROOF OF LE!MA 3: The proof is by contradiction. Kote that
CIII ` 6ór[~ó ]
If it is optimal not to use all available collateral. then reducing A should
increase the welfare of a good borrower at t-0. ~ow
-al;IlóH~óHl~a6
- óH[aaH~è9] f 6(ac`H~ae] - d[1-v](óH1~xH ia9} t 6{aCH ia9)]
I I III III
- óvëL[~IfI~~]'
(For the definítion of l;I(óH~óHl, see (3). The parametric expressions for the
various instrueents are defined in Theoren 41. We can thus write
-al'I(dHlóHl~a9
--6ógr;móH]-I óórv[óH] I- d6r~[móH]-1
-6 []-v]{dgór[~dH]-I - á ór[mdH]-I) - ó-vèr[óH]-1APP-16
Thus.
- atillóHlëHlla6
-- á[1-9~ór[E - d{1-v1][~dH]-1 ~ o. since E- 6[1-v] ~ o.
This ~eans reducinY 6 worsens the lot of the Qood borrower. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LEt~W 4: From Theorem 2 we know that
CH I
- dr[~óH]-1(1 , ~L - {1-6)66LS]-~1~-1~.
and from Theorem 4 we know that
CH 1
- dr[~dH]-1[1-i1-9}Q].
In both cases we used the assumption
Ci 5 WO ~ CÍ - CHIlloptl. where
In IA-311. this assumption becomes
árÍ~óH]-1(1 - fcéL - G12] 5 WO ~
where G12 e{1-(3}á dLil-f,tl~ 1. In IA
that
CI]Ilopt) : dr[~6H]-l
6r(q7óH]-7[2 - ~L - G12].
321. this assumption becomes Inotc
6 E [0. 1)1
ór[1 . E](~dH]-1 ~ Wo ~ 26r(spóH) 1.




si~ultaneously. It follows directly that the conditions in (27) guarantee
this. (~ote that. because }idL - G12 ~ 1, the ]ower bound on WO in (A-33) does
not exceed the upper bound in (A-34)). Q.E.D.
PROOF OF LE!A1A 5: The variables in contracts node II] in the single period
contract solution are
all] - r[dH] 1 d 9CIII[óH]
1.
CIII 5 W.
nIII - óL[R-aIII]{dL[R~HII] - 6W) 1.
IA 3~1APP-17
aIII - r[aL]-I' CIII - 0' nIII -]' IA-3G1
Instead, the bank could have offered a pooling contract, taking into account
the proportions v and ]- v of bad and good Dorrowers. respectively. The zero
expected proftt condition for the bank díctates that
áIII should satisfy
vóE[aIIi] { [1 - v]óH[QIII] - r,
which implies
aIII - r{v6L - [1-v]óH? ]. IA-371
Existence of equilibrium is guaranteed if good borrowers prefer the contract
in IA-35) to the pooling contract in IA-37). Thus. we need
~II](óH~dH) ~ ~IIIIóH~óH) 'H "11 "H
{~III' CIII' nlII} IaIII
This means we need
~III[óH{R - aIII) - d CII1] ~ áH[R - áIII].
I:pon substituting IA-35) and (A-37), the above inequality becomes
{dHR; - d [I-g]W}(óLR; - ~h'y-1 ? {dH[R-r{vdL - [1-v]óH)-1][óLR;]-1 IA-381
For the purpose of this proof we can make the existence restriction IA-381 less
restrictive by substituting W' CIII(optl. This gives (after rearranging)
ó[1-~][taóH]-] ~ v[{1-v)6H - vdEl 1. IA-39)
This i s the existence restrictíon for an optimally collateralized single period
separating contract. It is identical to the condition in footnote 12 in B-T
(19871. Recall that ( A-39) is less restrictive then (A-38) which is the 'real'
existence restriction for the separating contracts III. Hence. if we prove
that the existence restrictíon for separating contracts ín the second period
poo] of borrowers with bad first period realizations is less restrictive than
IA-39). then one eay conclude that ít ís also less restrictíve than (A-38).
The intertemporal pooling contract restriction. to be presented in Theorem 5.HPP-18
indicates that the second period contracts to borrowers with bad first period
realizations will be as bad es feasibility persits. This ieans that these
contracts will be the sa~e ns spot ~arket contracts. Ne will now derive the
exístence restriction for the opti~allty of separating second period contracts
in the poo] of Dorrowers with bad first period realizations. So, the pooling
alternative is not pure oolin but is as follows.
Pooling at t-1 for the borrowers with
Pooling at good first period realizations
Separating at t-] for borrowers with
bad first period realizations
It wil] be apparent later that. except for the origina] separating solution. no
other (poolingiseparating) alternatives exist. Since this wil] cause no
confusion. we wi]] refer to the eixed pooling~separating alternative as th~.
pooling contract alternative. The separating contracts are optisall~~
collateralized (notice that no co]]atera] is ]ost in the poo]ing contract at
t-01. Parametrically, the contracts are identica: to the single period
contract IV so]ution presented earlier. The optimal contracts are 1'- "s
indicate optimal values in the pooltng contract solutionl,
-~1 H -1 -H -~i H -1 -H H -1 ~i 0:8 - r(d ] - d gCB(d ] . CB - dr[md ] , trB - l:
~- r[dL) ]. B- 0, B- 1.
IA-40)
Fro~n Figure 1, we see that the pool of~borrowers with bad flrst period
realizatíons has a fraction f2 of borrowers that are bad in the aecond period
(the rest are good), where
fT e {[]-Y]dv - Yó }{(1-Y]6 - Y~}-1 IA-9]1
In a~anner analogous to (A-37), we can now design a pooling contract based on
the proportions f~ and ] -(). The pooling i nterest factor is
á - r(t)dL - [I~TJdH)-].
iLo
IA-421APP-19
Again. exístence ís guaranteed if
G (dHl ~ G (6 )
B I ~ -~ -~ B I {ccB, CB. nB) 4 .
(A-431
where l;B(6H) is the expected second period utility of a good borrower in the
pool of borrowers with bad first period realizations. That is.
1:B16H) - trB{dH[R - aH] - éCB).
l:pon substituting (A-40) and (A-42) in IA-43), we obtain
d []-9](mdH]-1 ~ A {[1 ~2]óH - ~L}-1
IA-441
See that IA-441 ís similar to IA-39). We will now prove that ( A-441 is less
restrictive than IA-39). The RHS of IA-39) Ss strictly increasine in v.
whereas that of ( A-441 is strictly increasing in f2. Hence. ít is sufficient to
show that f~ ~ v. or equivalently, that
{[]-Y]6v- Yó 14[]-Y]d - Yó }-1 ~ v.
But this is certainly true. Q.E.U.
PROOF' OF THEOREM 5: Apply the Simplex algorithm. Take into account only the
constraints 1291. 130), (32). (331 and (351. First. we add slack variables to
these constraints to obtain
-[{I-Y}dH - YóL]a] - G13a2 - G14dHaB - G146~CE - GI5óLoB
- S] - -2r
1291'
dLa] - dL[{1-~.c}óH ~ ~sdL]a2 } dóL~ - S2 z 2r 130)'
6Hc~ - 6~CB - S3 - r 1321'
-6Lo~ - 6CB - dLo~ - S4 - 0 1351'
dL~ - S5 - r 1331'
where G13 a[1-Y](óH)2 - YóL[1-~.t)dH - YdLfcdL
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S1 Sy S3 S~ SS
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S~ 0 0 0 IH (1-IH)0 0 0 0 l 0 0 r
S~ 0 0 0 -fL -(1-dL) lL 0 0 0 1 0 0
SS 0 0 0 0 0 fL 0 0 0 0 1 r
zj o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~~-z~ -f" -f"f" -cl-iH)cl-v)fH -cl-fH)2c1-~) -(1-eH)vaL o 0 0 0 01
TADL6AU 2:
al j
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S~ 0 0 0
Sd 0 0 0
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G1J w (1-Y]dv - YdL.
We now present the successive Simplex tableaus.
(It1SERT TABLEAUS ABOLI HERE]
Tableau 5 is the end-tableau íf all values i n the last coluwn are non-negative
and if all Cj - Z~ values are non-negative. Except for the C~ - Zj value in
the SS coluwn, these are easy to verify. Frow Tableau S. we get
[Cj - Z~]I -(dLj-11-G15dLéH[(1-Y)dH f YdLj 1` Gl6 - óvQL} (A-451
I.l ` SS
where GI6 - [ó ]2(1-v](1-~]dLm-1.
The expression in IA-451 can be positive or negative. Before writing down a
parametric restriction that fixes the sign of (A-45), we will give a derivation
which will result in (A-45) and has a significant economic weaning. First.
note that the solution in Tableau 5 indicates that bad borrowers at t-0 get a
better than first best contract over their credit hori2on Ithe expression for
S2 in Tableau 5 is non-negative: see also (301 and (301'). This better-than-
fírst-best contract is at the expense of good borrowers at t-0. Thus. we can
interpret the maximization procedure stated above as searching for the solution
that minimizes the premium bad borrowers at t-0 get over their first best
contract. Therefore. in an optima] solution one tries to give the waximum
feasible reward to borrowers with good first period realizations (see the
result a2 - 01. and impose the waximum feasíble penalty on borrowers with bad
first períod realizations ( see the result that they get spot warket separating
contracts). This ís the solution characterized in Tableau 5. However, one
other solution exists. That i s because the contracts offered to unsuccessful
first period types are separating ( see Figure 21, which i mplies that some
deadweight costs, related to collateral. are associated with those contracts.APP-2]
Look at (351 to see that reducing o~ enables the banks to decrease CB
The following diagra~ of perturbations is feasible.
CCHi
~1 ~-r ~ B follows froa the binding constraints (32) and (35)
follows fron the binding íntertewporal profit condition 129).
It follows froe the bínding constraints (29). (321. (33), and (35) that for all
e sufficiently snall, the fo]lowing set of perturbations hold
Co~ --e. Gal - CISdLE[11-YjdH - YdL]
1.
(A-46)
CCB -- dLem 1. ~ L ddL9e[mdH~-1
The effect of this set of perturbations on the objective functíon 128) ís
~i ~ 6(-G15dLdH{[]-YIdH - YdL1 1 - G16 - dHvdL?. IA-471
Compare IA-47) with ( A-451 to see that our assumptíon C~ - Z~ ~ 0 in I~ - SS
7ableaus 1 through 5 is identical to assuaing that it is not optiAal to give
unsecured loans in the second period to borrowers with bad first period
realizations. We can now distinguish two solutions. The first solution holds
when we assume that the e~pression for C~ - Zf I given in IA-45) is
.i - s5
non-positive. This solution can be found ín Tableau 5. The alternative
solution is based on the assueption that Cj - zj I is positive. i;ote
~ SS
that, since the ~odel is linear, E will be chosen auch that the perturbations
in (A-46) co~pletely eli~inate collateral. This íoplies
.
B L B. pCg - 0.
or equivalently.















subtract the perturbations listed above from the sing]e bar.
Tableau 5(or in the theoreml, to get the double bar.
solution in
solution also given
in thr theorem. Q.F:.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 6: -cf A1. The (separatingl spot oarket equilibrium exists
if it can not be broken by a pooling alternative. The pooling a]ternative
consists also of single period contracts. As in the intertemporal marke?
eyuilibrium case Isee Figure 2) it is a]so partly separating. As a matter of
fact. the pool of successful borrowers as wel] as the pool of unsuccessful
borrowers can be offered separating contracts. In that case these contracts
are optimally co]]aieralized contracts. Schematically we get.
t-0 t-]
6
Pooling contract a - r~d ]
where. d - []-Y]dH - YdL
standard optinally collateralized
separating contract




]-6 cze - r[dH~-1 ái~~B[dH~-]
B - 6r[~èH)-1. ~ - r[dL)-1APP-23
~ote that {a~. C~. a~) is separating if
ó [1-~][~6H]-1 ~ T{(1-TJdH - TdL}-1, IA-48)
where T m YóL~{YóL ~ [1-Y]éHy-1
The expression in (A-48) is a standard single period existence restriction.
Proofs can be found ín Lemma 5. The derívation for T follows from
Figure 2. The existence restriction for the contract {~. CB. ~} is derived
in Lemma S. However. the proof ín Lemma 5 índlcates that this restrictíon will
not be binding if the spot market ~ash equilibrium exists. Proving existenr.r
requires showing that the utility of a good borrower under the single period
contract solution in Theorem 2 exceeds its utility under the poo]ing contrect
solution above. Substitute the Theorem 2 solution ín the definition oF
L;IIdH~6H1 and use (31 to get
GIIdHIóHI - óHR` - [1-6]óCI - [dH]ZR~
- 6 [1-v]rrIII[óHRH - ó{1-g}W] - dvèLR;
The pooling alternative in the diagram above leads to.
L'IIdH1 - óH[R-r{6}-i] . {èH - ó (1-v]}{óHR; - [1-gJódr[~óH]-1}
- 6vdLRn IA-50)
Existence is guaranteed if CIIdH~óH) ~ ~I(dH). This results directly in
condition (38). Condltion (391 is atraightforward. This condítion
guarantees the existence of the separating contracts in the contract III nodes.
The LHS is the borrower's utility under the pooling contract. The RHS gives
the borrower's utility under the separating contract. Condition 140) is a
simílar conditíon for the contract IV nodes. For íts derivation. see Lemma 5.
-cf(B). The good borrower's utility under the intertemporal market equilibrium
in Theorem 4 should exceed its utility under the pooling contract equilibrium
in Theorem S. Given risk neutrality and the absence of rationing, this is theAPP-24
sane as requiring the borrowing cost for a good borrower to be ]ower in thc,
íntertemporal contract solution in Theorem 4 than in the pooling solution in
Theoren 5. The borrowing cost in Theoren 4 1s
dHaH - 6CH - ó[1-v][óHaH - óCH ] r dvdLcïcL I I III III ]II
The borrowing cost in Theoren 5 is
dá1 - d [1-v][d~ - ~] - dvd~.
IA-5] )
1A-521
Existence is guaranteed if (A-51) ~(A-52). This results directly tn conditioii
14]). Condition (42) is derived in Theoren 3. and explicit]y assuned in
Theorem 4. 71ie assumption 1431 is of no special value. It is just to indicate
that we focus on the puu]ing contract solution in 136).
A11 that remains is to show that the set of parameter values for which
138) -(43) and (A-48) are satisfied is non-empty. It can be easily verified
that the following parameter values achieve this.
.75
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CI - CIII ` h0~
Q.E.n.S-1





the success probability for a bad borrower:
the success probability for a good borrower:
the credit granting probabi]ity in the set of contracts
type i(i E{L, H}, J E{I, II. III. IV, V}I:
J for borrower
cz~ ~ the interest factor ( - one plus the interest rate) in the set of contracts
j for borrower type í(1 E{L. H). J E{I. II, IfI, IV, V}):
~- measure of the bank's evaluation of a borrower's collateral. That is. S1
collateral has a value of p to the bank:
Y I1-Y) ~ the proportion oC bad ( good) borrowers at ts0:
ín the set of nodes II:
IV:
V:
Y~ (1-~Fl a the proportion of bad (goodl borrowers at t-1 within the pool of
borrowers rationed at t-0:
f) (l~ïl ~ the proportion of bad (goodl borrowers within the pool of borrowers
with bad first period realizations:
T(1-T) ~ the proportion of bad (good) borrowers within the pool of borrowers
with good first period realizations;
a s Lagrange multiplier:
p~ decay parameter for delayed investment projects;




6 a (1-YJdH ~ YóL
m ~ {óH[1-óL] - ~óL(1-dHJ1(dH}-1
E m {dHll-dL} - vdL[1-óH]}{dH}-]
OIIllopt)
a[dH - óLJr[~dHJ-1 - the level of collateral in an optimallyS-2
collateralized single period contract:
R~ the return on the invests~ent project if successful:
r~ the risk free interest factor 1~ one plus the risk free interest rate):
WO - the initia] (t-O1 leve] of avai]able collatera] for each individual
borrower:
W e W - C - the avai]able collatera] in the second period if 0
ICI has been lost in the firat period:
the collatera] asked in the set of contracts j fro~n a type i borrower
(i E{L. Hy: Y E{I. II. III. IV, V});
[;j(dk~ói) - the expected ability for a type i borrower who chooses the tyre
k contracts, starting froa ihe set of nodes j:
al - the first period pooling interest rate:
az - the ser.ond period pooling interest rate conditioned on a good first
period realization:
6 a óH - dL
ól e]- ói. i E{H. L1
Hn - R- r[61J-I. j E(H. I.)
~~ s dynamic strategic credit policy of bank i
gsl e first period credit po]icy
`BZlyl. XII - second period credit policy applicable to borrower with first
period contract choice y~ end first period realization
X1.
K- set of all possible competing banks ( there are n banks)
3~i e net expected profit of bank i
K1 e borrower's first period type
KZ L borrower's second period type
z-(K1, XI. K21 is borrower's composite type
)'2 e borrower's second period contract choice
i - bank's objective function
~ e LagrangianS-3
a2 ~ the second period pooling interest rate conditíoned on a bad first period
realizatíon:
In Lemma S it is established that the bad return pool within an
intertemporal pooling contract gets a separating contact. The following
variables are defined for that case.
- second period interest factor for bad types i n the pool of ~
unsuccessful first períod borrowers:
H
~ a second period interest factor for good types in the pool of
unsuccessful fírst period borrowers;
CB ~ second period collateral asked from a good types in the poo] of
unsuccessful first period borrowers:
Some additional symbols:
"" on top of variables indicates the Iseparatíng) single-period-contract
solution:
-" on top of variables indicates the Iseparatingl intertemporal contract
solution:
-" or "-" on top of variables indicates the (intertemporal) pooling contract
solution.i
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